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INTRODUCTION
The  dispute  between  Canada  and  the  United  States  on  the  supply  managed
commodities  of dairy and poultry  is a long standing one that goes back at least two decades.
The dispute has its roots in each country's agricultural  policies which now have structures,
investments and stakeholders built  around them.  The dairy and poultry  dispute is a good
example  of how policy choices  can  make harmonization,  compatibility  and  consistency
(H/C/C)  not only difficult to  achieve  but also can  lead to conflict.  Yet this dispute also
provides  insight  into how  policy  harmonization  can  be  achieved,  disputes  avoided  and
trading relationships improved.
One of the keys to understanding the dairy and poultry dispute is to take account of
the  division  of  powers  over  agriculture  and  food  matters  which  has  led  to  supply
management in Canada and the  Federal Marketing  Order system in the United States.  To
protect  these  programs,  non-tariff barriers  were  put  in  place  which  were  subsequently
legitimized  by use of international dispute settlement mechanisms  and, in some cases, the
national courts.
The  trade environment  between  Canada  and the United  States  is  changing.  The
United  States  is  becoming  more  sensitive  to  the  realities  of using  dispute  settlement
mechanisms and the wider perception  that the United States cannot control the outcome of
such efforts'.  Canada is quietly becoming more confident in its role as a food exporter and
this brings with it a different approach to trade matters.
By reviewing a number of the international cases arising from the poultry and dairy
dispute,  we will try to demonstrate how the dispute evolved  and also identify some of the
1 A coalition of 21  lobby groups, the American  Coalition for Competitive Trade, has
started a legal effort to overturn the authority of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement)  Panel in the U.S. Court of Appeal.182~  ~  Prceig
failures  and opportunities for harmonization.  We also will identify some of  the market forces
which are currently  working toward harmonization  in these two sectors.
Our conclusion is that harmonization of the poultry and dairy industries on a NAFTA
basis (Canada,  United  States, Mexico)  is well underway  and  will be achieved by  market
forces  rather than by political leadership.  Moreover,  within North America,  Canada can be
a consistent exporter of both dairy and poultry products while maintaining a larger share of
the  Canadian  market  than  most  analysts  have  projected,  providing  that  the  necessary
adjustment process  in the production  and processing sectors  is given time to be completed.
Finally,  our  paper  makes  no  attempt  to  differentiate  between  harmonization,
compatibility and consistency.  Instead, we have taken the broad approach of defining H/C/C
as any  change which achieves or makes possible freer trade  in dairy and poultry products.
HISTORY OF CANADA-U.S.  DISPUTE IN DAIRY AND  POULTRY:  THE CASES
AND  ISSUES
The General Agreement  on  Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  Working Party on Canadian
Import Quotas on Eggs  (1/4279)  adopted February 17,  1976
Dispute Settlement Mechanism  On  September  9,  1976,  the  United  States  requested  a
meeting of the GATT Council of Representatives  to discuss the establishment of a working
party to make an advisory ruling on Canada's import quota for shell  eggs and egg products
set up under  GATT Article XI.
Issues  The United States asked for an  advisory ruling on the following:
a)  Does  the  Canadian  supply  management  system  on  eggs  conform  to  the
requirements of GATT Article XI?
b)  Is the basis for determining the import quotas  in accord with the requirements
of the last paragraph of Article XI?
c)  Irrespective of the findings under (a)  and (b) above, does the imposition of the
Canadian quotas under Article XI constitute nullification and impairment of
a prior binding?
Working  Party  Terms  of  Reference  "To  examine  the  matters  referred  to  the
CONTRACTING PARTIES by the Government of the United States (L/4223) concerning the
imposition of import quotas for eggs and egg products by the  Government of Canada
(L/4207), and to report  thereon to the Council."
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The Decision  All but  the United  States  agreed  that  Canada's  egg supply  management
program was in conformity with GATT Article XI.2 The working party suggested the parties
revisit the "representative" period upon which the import quotas were to be calculated.
3 On
the third  question  of nullification  of prior binding,  the working party did  not come  to a
conclusion.
Comments and Observations The United  States did not make a similar  challenge  to the
dairy and turkey import quotas  also in place  at that time or those subsequently set up  for
chicken and hatching eggs.  It would appear that the egg reference  was  a test case for the
United  States.  The issue of effective  control was not raised  again until the United  States
challenged,  in the  GATT, the addition  by  Canada of ice  cream and yogurt to  the import
control  list.  The  "pressure"  of maintaining effective  control  did play  a key  role within
Canada and allowed provinces with less production  to use the withdrawal  threat effectively.
Such a strategy  for a larger province was not credible because  it was argued that effective
control would be lost and Canada would no longer be in conformity with GATT Article  XI
thereby  losing its ability to protect the border with import quota.  Considering that Ontario
joined the Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC),  formerly the  Canadian Chicken Marketing
Agency,  only because this would allow border controls to be put in place, the significance
of the United States raising this issue at the working party in the evolution of Canada's supply
management  program should not be underestimated.4
Looking  back,  the  one  vote  per  province  arrangement  in  Canadian  supply
management marketing plans, combined  with the "restrict"  provision of GATT Article XI,
gave sufficient power to each province to essentially override the intent in the legislation to
allocate growth on the basis of  comparative  advantage.  The failure to execute this key aspect
of the legislation has prevented production  adjustments  from taking place in response to a
2 The United States did not agree because they stated effective domestic production
control has not been achieved  and, therefore,  domestic production was not restricted. Some
industry stakeholders  in Canada would have agreed with this  view at that time  since eggs  and
not layers were  being counted. The problem,  however, is in defining  "effective"  and this term in
Canada,  over time, has come to  mean that at least 90 percent or more of Canadian production  is
directly participating  in the supply management program. The findings of this working party
remained until the World  Trade Organization  (WTO)  Agreement replaced GATT Article XI.
3 This was done, resulting in a doubling of access.
4 It is still a mystery to some in Canada as to why the United States did not raise the issue
of effective control when the third  largest chicken producing province,  namely British Columbia,
withdrew  from the  CFC. The CFC tried to protect its "effective"  control through a separate
agreement  but B.C.  set production  levels during this time,  independent of the CFC. It could have
been debated whether the B.C. agreement  is a "governmental  measure"  as set out in GATT
Article  XI. If one recalls that GATT Article XI has its origins with the United States, it is ironic
that the United  States should be challenging its use. The United  States has been criticized for
choosing  a working party format rather than a full panel.  Some U.S. trade law experts have cited
the egg working party decision as an example of a bad trade law decision.
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changing market.  The failure to allow such adjustments may yet prove to be more of a threat
to the supply management system than external  forces.
Successfully resisting the U.S. challenge gave Canadian policy makers confidence that
GATT  Article  XI  could  be  used  to  "protect"  the  domestic  industry.  The  long  run
consequences of eliminating competition  among processors, producers and provinces  while
controlling import competition were either not examined or ignored.5 It is speculation, but
had the United States not challenged Canada,  domestic participants beyond the farm  gate,
as well as policy analysts, might have  been more effective  in influencing the way supply
management programs evolved.  The egg working party decision also shifted the balance  of
power in food policy matters to the Canadian  federal  government.  Had the United States
chosen  to challenge  Canada by way of a panel  of trade experts,  it is possible that a more
restrictive interpretation of  GATT Article XI would have resulted.  With less effective border
protection  available,  the advantage of creating  new supply management  programs  would
have been reduced.
The GATT Panel on  Ice Cream and Yogurt (L/6568,  September 27,  1989, Adopted  in
December  1989)
Dispute Settlement  Mechanism  The consultative and dispute settlement provisions  as set
out in the GATT.
Issues.  The United States is the main exporter of ice cream and yogurt products  to Canada.
On January 28,  1988,  Canada amended the import control  list by adding ice cream products
and yogurt.  This decision significantly  reduced  the ability of the United  States to export
these products.  The Panel, therefore,  was asked by the United States to restore  its access by
making  a  recommendation  that  Canada  eliminate  its quotas  and  import permit  system.
Canada stated that its actions were consistent with GATT Article XI.
At issue was the scope of coverage  provided by GATT Article XI.
GA TTPanel Terms of  Reference  "To examine, in the light of  the relevant GATTprovisions,
the matter referred to  the  CONTRACTING PARTIES by the  United States in document
L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings  providedfor in Article XXIII:2."
5  One attempt to  examine the issues was the (1976)  cost of production formula challenge
by the Consumers' Association of Canada  (CAC) for eggs.  This was lost, in part, because the
CAC was overwhelmed  by the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency's (CEMA)  legal counsel and
accountants,  but much of what the CAC raised as concerns proved to be valid. Similarly, the
Food Prices Review Board and the Economic  Council of Canada  raised concerns about supply
management  which were  not heard.  The failure to listen to other stakeholders  was a point also
made by Kempton Matte at the dairy session last year.
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The Decisions The Panel concluded that ice cream and yogurt did not compete directly with
raw milk and would not undermine the milk supply management program if left uncontrolled
at the border.  Choosing to keep the scope of GATT Article XI narrow,  the Panel found ice
cream and yogurt not to be "like" milk and, therefore,  Canada did not meet the conditions  set
out in GATT Article XI.  The Panel recommended that Canada be requested by the GATT
to terminate the restrictions.
Comments and Observations The Panel did not rule on the meaning of "in early stages of
processing"  or the meaning of "still perishable" or the issue of what  it means to "restrict"
production  or have  "effective"  control.  The United States, this time, had a much stronger
case on the failure  of Canada  to "restrict" milk production  which included  evidence that
overproduction had occurred  six years  in a row.  The Panel, in commenting on its decision
not to rule on the meaning of "restrict", did state that the concept of "restricting"  production
as distinct from regulating production was difficult to apply in practice.  It is unfortunate that
the Panel chose not to comment further because a finding on this matter could have modified
the Canadian  perception  of an  "effective"  control which  was formed  from  the shell  egg
working party.  Again, this is speculation,  but a finding that overproduction is evidence of
a failure to restrict production could have provided Canadian policy analysts with additional
means  to influence  the way supply management programs  continued to evolve or at least
raised some concerns for the policy makers to consider.
On the finding that ice cream and yogurt did not compete directly with raw milk, the
Panel  also  noted  that  GATT  Article  XI  was  not  designed  to  protect  the  producer  or
processing industries  from international  competition  and it was never intended to be used to
promote  self-sufficiency. 6 It  was  feared  in  Canada  that  the  Panel  findings  could  also
encourage the United States to challenge the import control of further processed chicken and
turkey products or challenge  the entire system if the Panel sided with the United States on
the issue of "restricting"  production. This challenge never happened primarily,  we suspect,
because the United States  felt it could achieve a more desirable outcome  at the GATT. This
aspect of the U.S. trade strategy was confirmed by the recent NAFTA Panel in reviewing the
intentions  of the parties.
The ice cream and yogurt situation is an example of  political considerations overriding
economic ones.  The Canadian government was informed that putting ice cream and yogurt
on the import control list would be a high risk effort and if challenged at the GATT, could
be lost.  However,  the government overruled this advice due primarily to the sensitivity of
dairy matters to the province of Quebec  and the need to show that the federal system was
essential  for Quebec  agriculture.7 Whereas  Canada was looking  at the Uruguay Round to
6 A similar ruling was handed down by the Panel  on Japanese agricultural quotas -
L/6253, November  18,  1987.
7  The threat of separation was often a factor influencing the government  on dairy policy.
Canada was able to put off implementing  the Panel findings by suggesting that the  GATT
negotiations  were underway and serious proposals to clarify the working of GATT Article XI
were being put forward and considered.  From the U.S. perspective, the Panel ruling was the first
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justify its restrictions with a strengthening of GATT Article XI, the United States was hoping
to use the same Round to eliminate  GATT Article  XI  exceptions.  Once again, the dispute
settlement mechanism,  even though the United States prevailed this time, failed to defuse the
dispute.
The  Canada-U.S.  Trade Agreement  (CUSTA)  (1989)  and  NAFTA  (1995)  Trade
Agreements
CUSTA
The next time Canada and the  United States faced the issue of supply management
was during the agricultural negotiations  leading to the CUSTA of 1989.  The United States
pressed  for an agreement  on agriculture  without exceptions  while Canada  insisted  on the
right  to  protect the  supply managed  commodities through  the  use of quantitative  import
restrictions.  To  achieve  this,  Canada did  agree to  provide  the  United States  with  some
increased access  for chicken, turkey,  shell eggs, and egg products  (see Article  706 below).
Since  both parties  had domestic  dairy programs  in place,  it was  agreed  not to make  any
reference  in the  CUSTA to dairy.
Article  706: Market Access for Poultry and Eggs
If Canada  maintains or introduces quantitative import restrictions  on any)  of
the following goods,  Canada  shall permit the importation of such goods as
follows.
a)  the level of global import quota on chicken and  chicken products, as
defined in Annex  706, for any given year shall be  no less than 7.5
percent of the previous year's domestic production of chicken  in
Canada,
b)  the  level of global import quota on turkey and turkey products, as
defined in Annex  706, for any given year shall be  no less than 3.5
percent of that  year's Canadian  domestic turkey production quota, and
c)  the level of global import quotas on  eggs and egg products for any
given year shall be  no  less than the following percentages of the
previous year's Canadian  domestic shell egg production.
I)  1.647 percent  for shell eggs,
ii)  0. 714 percentforfrozen, liquid and  further  processed  eggs, and
iii)  0. 62 7 percent  for powdered eggs.
international  proof that Canada had expanded the use of GATT Article  XI to restrict trade and
access.
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In the CUSTA,  Canada and the United States also agreed to work towards eliminating
technical  barriers  to  trade  and  setting  up  working  groups  to  harmonize  or  achieve
equivalency  in the following areas:
I)  Animal Health,
ii)  Plant Health, Seeds  and Fertilizers,
iii)  Meat and Poultry inspection,
iv)  Dairy, Fruit,  Vegetable and Egg Inspection,
v)  Veterinary Drugs and Feeds,
vi)  Food, Beverage and Colour Additives and Unavoidable Contaminants,
vii)  Pesticides,  and
viii)  Packaging and Labelling of Agricultural,  Food, Beverage  and Certain Related
Goods for Human Consumption.
In addition, Canada and the United  States agreed to work towards developing  a new
regime to address dumping and subsidization.
"Article  1907  provides  that  the  two  governments  will  work  towards
establishing  a new regime to address  problems of dumping and  subsidization
to come  into effect no later than at the end of the seventh year. During the
course of  the current negotiations, the two sides recognized that developing a
new regime was a complex task and would require  more time.  The goal of any
new regime, however, will be to obviate the needfor border remedies, as are
now sanctioned  by the GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes, for example,
by  developing new  rules on  subsidy practices and relying on  domestic
competition  law.  Thus  the  goal of the  two  governments  remains  the
establishment  of  a new regime to replace current trade  remedy law well before
the end of the transition  period."
"Article 1907.  Working Group
1.  The Parties  shall establish a Working Group that shall.
a)  seek  to  develop  more  effective  rules  and
disciplines concerning the  use  of government
subsidies,
b)  seek to  develop a substitute system or rules for
dealing  with  unfair pricing and  government
subsidization; and
c)  consider anyproblems that may arise  with respect
to  the  implementation  of  this  Chapter  and
recommend solutions, where appropriate.
2.  The Working Group shall report to the Parties  as soon as  possible. The
Parties shall use  their best efforts  to  develop  and implement  the
substitute system of rules within the time limits established in Article
1908."
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Comments  The increase in access granted to the United States for poultry was an arbitrarily
chosen number.  However,  in trying to defend this concession to Canadians, one politician
said that the Canadian industry  should not be concerned  because the increase  was "about"
equal to  the  supplementary  import permits  that had been  issued  in previous  years.  This
unfortunate justification has stuck and served to alert the chicken, turkey and egg agencies
to  the  "danger"  of supplementary  imports.  As  a  result,  the  Agencies  have  resisted  all
attempts to allow any imports  in addition to the global import access annually available, even
if such issuance  is a reasonable  solution to a problem  in the market place  created  by the
regulatory environment.  A more liberal import policy would have provided more flexibility
to an otherwise rigid system and,  as a result, would probably have provided more scope for
market forces to influence  industry structure  (e.g. the average Canadian farm  size for both
poultry and dairy).
The harmonization committees have quietly gone about their work although the effort
was  much  more  energetic  in  the  early  years  following  the  agreement.  Much  has  been
achieved,  more because of industry pressure on both sides of the border and technological
developments than because of  the CUSTA.  Nevertheless, the existence of the committee did
provide a mechanism which is being used.  However, our view is that the usefulness of these
committees has been reduced by failing  to involve industry as active participants.  The pace
and agenda is still  in the hands of government and the process of decision-making is far from
transparent.
The bold attempt to  develop  new anti-dumping  and countervail  procedures  which
would eliminate the need for border controls has so far failed.  Perhaps it was the experience
with the bilateral panels that reduced U.S.  enthusiasm for the project, but we are well past
the seventh  year and little has been achieved.8 The longer than expected GATT Round was
a factor, but we suspect neither country is now anxious to pursue this task.  With the NAFTA
Panel decision  in hand, Canada's incentive to develop a new regime  is reduced even further,
at least from the agricultural perspective.  If policy analysts  can convince the policy makers
in Canada and  the United  States that  gains  from free trade  in poultry  and dairy exist, the
process could be picked up again.  However,  so far, a win-win outcome for producers in both
countries has not been documented by policy  analysts.
NAFTA
During the NAFTA  negotiations,  agricultural  issues were raised  but did not receive
as much attention  as non-agricultural  ones.  This was because  both the United  States and
Canada had expectations regarding agriculture that might result from the then ongoing GATT
discussions.  As  a result,  the CUSTA  understandings  on  agriculture  were  restated  in the
NAFTA for Canada and the United  States and, as well, the parties agreed to again "protect"
their GATT rights.
8 In the NAFTA,  both Canada  and the United  States agreed to eliminate the timetable  set
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For poultry products, Mexico and the United States agreed to minimum access levels
as well  as a ten-year adjustment  period before  free  trade would take effect.  To  give the
Mexican poultry and egg industry time to adjust, the decline in tariffs would not begin until
the  sixth year  and then  decline  at the rate  of 25  percent annually.  Similarly,  for dairy
products,  Mexico and the United States agreed to a ten-to-fifteen year adjustment period and
tariffication.
Comments  It is not known to us how the Canadian and Mexican poultry and egg industries
compare  competitively,  but we suspect  that  Canada may have the edge.  This raises  the
question,  if Mexico  can live with a ten year adjustment period, why is this not possible for
the Canadian industry?  Elements beyond the farm gate in Canada have suggested a ten-year
phase-in is worth considering and U.S. poultry and egg industry participants have expressed
similar views.9
As a footnote, Mexican buyers of MSCM (mechanically separated chicken meat) have
made serious efforts to buy from Canada but the high tariffs have made it uncompetitive with
the United  States. It would appear an opportunity  to develop  a poultry export market has
been missed.  This demonstrates  how policies can rob the policy maker of the flexibility  to
make reasonable choices.  A similar approach (poultry and eggs left out) was recently taken
in the trade agreement with Chile. Forgoing export opportunities to keep Canadian industry
protection does not appear to be a policy which is sustainable either internally  or externally
at the next round of multilateral trade negotiations.
The NAFTA  Panel in the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin
Agricultural Products (Secretariate File No.  CDA-95-2008)  December  2,  1996
Mechanism  Article 2006(4) of NAFTA to pursue consultations  and Article 2007 to provide
the Free Trade Commission an opportunity  to resolve the dispute.  Article 2008  to establish
an arbitration panel.
Products Covered  Dairy,'1 poultry, eggs, barley and margarine, including their respective
products.
The Issue  The United States  alleged that Canada increased tariffs for a range of agricultural
products contrary to Canada's NAFTA undertakings.  Canada agreed that the duties had been
raised but justified its action on the basis that this was tariffication consistent with Canada's
obligations  as  set  out  in  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  establishing  the  WTO.  At  issue,
9 The U.S.  dairy industry's willingness to engage in a ten-year phase out for most dairy
tariffs with Mexico suggests the Canadian dairy industry  could have done the same and supports
our point on poultry.
10  Dairy includes milk, yogurt, buttermilk, whey, butter and other milk fats and oils,
cheese  curd, ice  cream and other preparations  containing milk and milk products.
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therefore,  is which  agreement  takes  precedence  in  light of the  relevant  provision of the
NAFTA.  The Panel was not asked  to make recommendations  for resolution of the dispute.
Findings  The Panel took particular care to sort out the timing of the various agreements
Canada  and  the  United  States  had  reached  since  negotiations  were  ongoing  both  at  a
multilateral  and bilateral level.  Of importance  is the Panel observation that Canada and the
United States agreed that exports in excess of the import quotas for certain agricultural goods
would continue to be  governed by multilateral agreements.  Based on these observations, the
intent of the parties,  and the wording in the relevant agreements,  the Panel concluded that
Canada's action to put into effect the tariffication option provided by the WTO conforms with
the provisions of the NAFTA.
Comments  and Observations  A late intervention  by the United  States suggested that the
Panel  should consider  the  special  situation  of ice  cream  and  yogurt  since the non-tariff
barriers  on these products  had been ruled  as being outside  GATT Article XI  by a  GATT
Panel.  The  Panel did assess this matter but concluded  it had no basis  for questioning  the
tariffication schedules  agreed to by the parties as part of the WTO.  It would appear that the
United  States  should have questioned  the  inclusion  of ice  cream  and yogurt  in the tariff
schedules exchanged among the parties  in  1994.  The  opportunity to put into effect the ice
cream and yogurt panel decision, therefore,  has been missed by the United States and the
tariffication process has made all the GATT Article XI  issues irrelevant.
The panel decision means the  United States  focus will shift to the next WTO round
where a case can be made for a rapid decline in tariffication duties.  Canada will have to be
alert to the  possibility of a WTO decision on the  poultry and dairy tariffs which could be
worse  than  a transition  period  negotiated  directly  with  the  United  States.  However,  we
suspect  Canadian  governments  are  more  comfortable  implementing  multilateral  trade
decisions  than bilateral  ones.
Some observers  commenting on the NAFTA  Panel suggested that even if Canada
wins, further  negotiations with the United  States would quickly have to follow.  We  see no
evidence of this nor any compelling need for Canada to do so.
The call for this NAFTA Panel, in part, may lie in the lack of  results from the Canada-
U.S.  bilateral discussions held in Geneva between  Mr.  Goodale and then U.S.  Secretary of
Agriculture, Mr. Espy.  Perhaps the failure to find any common ground  at those discussions
provided Canada with further justification  that tariffication  was the best  course of action,
while the United States became more convinced of its position.  Choosing tariffication as the
means of dealing with the U.S. dairy and poultry trade has the disadvantage of leaving U.S.
concerns unresolved domestically.  It also weakens the Canadian  government's position on
agricultural matters  at a time when  a strong  federal hand is needed if Canada is to take its
place as a major food producer  in the world.
Once  tariffication  duties  were  put  in place,  the  requirement  for  national  supply
management agencies to maintain effective control over production was removed.  Removing
the  "effective"  control  function takes  away  one  of the  key  reasons  for  the  existence  of
national  agencies  and makes  it more difficult to  develop  a competitive  Canadian  poultry
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industry."  Already,  the CFC  has  felt the effect  of this change  and are  now  operating  a
"bottom  up"  allocation  approach  under which  the  CFC,  in  effect,  "rubber  stamps"  the
allocation requests of  the provinces.  This new allocation approach was proposed by Ontario,
confident with the knowledge that border protection is firmly  in place.  Similarly, in turkey,
the Ontario  Turkey Producers Marketing Board recently filed a withdrawal  notice with the
Canadian  Turkey  Marketing  Agency  (CTMA)  over  quota  and  export  credit  matters,




Canada  and  the  United  States  have  accepted  each  others'  inspection  systems  as
equivalent even though there are differences  in detail and in some cases, approach.  The key
is that officials  agree similar results are achieved and, therefore, the objective of the relevant
legislation  is met.  An attempt through  the courts  by the National  Broiler Council  in the
United  States to  have  equivalency  defined as  "identical,"  failed.  This  action was  taken
mainly with the Europeans  in mind, not Canada.  The United States and European Union are
currently testing the meaning of equivalency  and appear to be heading for a showdown.  The
WTO  Agreement  on  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  provisions should  bring some  sense and
reason to the equivalency issue because food safety  factors are now the accepted justification
for import restrictions,  not the failure of being equivalent.  By eliminating  the equivalency
issue, the scope for conflict is reduced.
The U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  mega-regulation  is again  testing the
equivalency  status of Canadian  inspection  regulations  but so  far,  Canada  has met  all the
conditions.  In both Hazard Analysis  Critical Control Point (HACCP)  system and the new
Food  Inspection  Agency,  Canada  is  ahead  of  the  United  States  and  some  industry
stakeholders  in the United  States  have  indicated  (unofficially) their  desire to  move  in a
similar direction.  In Canada,  because a higher level of cooperation exists between  industry
and government,  it has been able to move somewhat quicker on inspection matters  and U.S.
officials  appear  to  respect  this  factor  rather  than  turn  it  into  an  issue  of equivalency.
However, this can change quickly because the United States has many more active consumer
lobby groups than does Canada and there  is always the possibility that someone will take
legal action hoping to force the U.S. government to behave  differently.
" Those in Canada wanting  a strong competitive Canadian poultry industry might have
been wishing for a decision in favour of the United States.  Similarly, the business community  in
general  is not happy that uncertainty remains.
12 At the time of writing, the problems underlying the Withdrawal Notice appear to be
resolved.
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The U.S.  Role  in Supporting Canadian Supply Management  Programs
Creating Fear  As we  have already noted, the  United  States,  in its attempts  to challenge
Canada's  trade restrictions put in place under GATT Article XI for dairy and poultry, may
actually have served to forge support for this policy and influenced  its evolution.
Similarly, repeated and consistently overstated  estimates of how big a share the U.S.
dairy  and poultry exporters  could obtain of the  Canadian market  only served  to convince
producers  and policy makers of the need  to keep trade protection  in place. 1 3 This kind of
lobbying information  feeds the misconception that the Canadian dairy and poultry sectors are
not competitive with their U.S. counterparts.  Many Canadian producers in these sectors now
fear competition from U.S. producers.  Such fears and efforts  encourage policy conflict and
build the foundation  for serious disputes where parties  can easily underestimate  each others
resolve.'4 To better understand supply management  issues, U.S. policy analysts should  look
at Canada  as a federation of twelve  separate "countries"  or more like the EU model rather
than like the United States.
Providing a Safety  Valve  Perhaps the  most overlooked factor in the longevity of Canadian
supply management systems  is the  geographic proximity  of Canada to  one of the world's
largest producers  of poultry and  dairy products.  This factor played a much bigger role  in
poultry  than in  dairy but,  nevertheless,  was  a  key  element  in the  acceptability  of supply
management to the Canadian public.  On behalf of Canadian  consumers, the CAC and the
Department of Consumers and Corporate Affairs, fought to ensure that Canadian producers
of supply managed commodities would not be allowed to control  production and raise prices
to unreasonable  levels.
In the absence of direct competition,  unreasonable price levels  were quite possible
even  though  the competition of substitutes  still existed.  One  way of ensuring  that retail
prices  would not be unreasonable  was the creation of a mechanism which became  known as
13 Overstated estimates again appeared last year when  Canadian supply management
groups hired  Infometrica  Ltd. to do a study of the economic impact if Canada were to lose border
protection  and  165 U.S. companies  pushed the United States to keep up  its fight for more  access.
The Infometrica  study estimated losses in market share of 20  to 25 percent, job losses of
138,000 over a five-year period, an economic output loss of $16 billion, and a tax revenue  loss of
$18.1 billion through  to the year 2000.  The U.S. ad hoc coalition suggested that gains of
US$300  million in chicken and US$1  billion  in dairy  were likely.  These gains are even greater
than the estimated losses by Infometrica.
14 The United States may have misread Canada's resolve  in the last GATT Round because
the United States, we understand,  offered Canada a ten-year period to phase out dairy and poultry
border controls which Canada  rejected.  On several  occasions in Geneva, the United States was
taken back by the uncompromising  approach Canada took on supply management  issues in
Geneva.  It appears the United States was not well prepared for the new Liberal government and
were still basing their perceptions  on the Conservative government with which the United  States
had negotiated the  CUSTA.
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the supplementary import system.'5 In short, this mechanism allowed the Minister in charge
of import permits to issue permits whenever a market shortage  existed. The administration
of this  safety valve  proved  to be tricky  and  controversial  but  it worked  and  did provide
additional  chicken  at critical times. 1 6 This safety  valve worked  only because the  United
States was ready, at a moments notice, to supply Canada with whatever poultry product was
needed.  By being  a  ready supplier  whenever  the supply  management  manager  made  a
mistake (and mistakes were made), the United States prevented the Canadian consumer  from
experiencing the market realities that often resulted from attempts to control production and
has  happened in other countries  that attempted  to control  production.  The United States,
therefore,  assisted Canadian policy makers by blunting the full market impact of controlling
production. 
1
It is our view that the United States has never taken the time to fully understand the
administrative  procedures  that make up  the  import control  regime.'8 Similarly,  we  can
generalize and say that on both sides of the border, the way policy is administered is often
not as great a concern  to analysts  as the policy itself.  Yet,  our experience  is that both are
equally  important and a policy objective can often be undone by administrative procedures
15The other way was that supply management producers agreed  not to price by the
market but rather be guided by the cost of production.
16  On two occasions the discretion of the Minister to issue permits was challenged all the
way to the Supreme  Court but in both cases, the courts rejected any attempt to bind or put
conditions on the exercise of discretion.  Even the condition in the Export and Import Permits
Act that the Minister must act to support supply management was interpreted  so liberally that the
Minister could, if he wished,  allow sufficient imports to  put pressure on producer prices.
Reference Maple Lodge Farms vs the Government of Canada and the Canadian Association of
Regulated Importers vs the Attorney General  of Canada.
17  One astute observer at the Department of Finance, in about  1978, suggested the
Canadian government give the supply management agencies total control over supplementary
permits because they would misuse this power and bring about their own demise. He may have
been right but this was not done and to this day, the government still controls the supplementary
import system which can be used  as a lever to make  changes if the government wishes to
exercise this option.
18  This was demonstrated when  Carla Hills visited Michael Wilson on one of the regularly
scheduled  trade talks.  KFC and other companies  had complained to the U.S. Trade
Representatives  Office  that access  was being denied and this was causing problems.  Ms. Hills
raised the issue and Mr.  Wilson suggested  that KFC  should make use of the supplementary
import system.  They  subsequently did and received about 5 kilotonnes in access for new
products, about  10 percent of the existing access.  The United States was no doubt surprised by
this development but it shows that opportunities  may have existed which the United  States did
not fully exploit and which could have served to reduce the intensity of the poultry conflict.
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which  frustrate  the  policy  objective.  Similarly,  it  should  be  clear  that  the  choice  of
administrative procedures  can serve  either to promote harmonization or prevent  it. 9
Fear of One-Way  Trade  Other than the perception of some producers that they will never
be  able to compete, the  next biggest obstacle  to harmonization  is U.S. trade laws and U.S.
senators who exploit these laws.? 0 The perception  in Canada  is that the United States wants
Canada  to open  its border for  all food products but  if Canada makes  inroads  on the  U.S.
market, even by a small share, questions are raised and often action to reduce the trade flow
is  the  result.  For  example,  at  the  recent  Outlook  Conference,  the  newly  appointed
representative of the U.S. Trade Representatives  Office, Ms. Barshefsky,  noted that Canada
was  exporting subsidized  eggs into the United  States.  Potato exports have been  a growth
item  for Canada  recently  and  it  looks  like Canada captured  about 5 percent of the  U.S.
market  last year.  As a result, the U.S.  International Trade Commission (ITC)  is launching
an investigation which could lead to trade action.  As the hog and  softwood industries have
found  out, these actions are expensive  and disruptive even if the dispute is won.
GENERAL COMMENTS  AND OBSERVATIONS
In reviewing  the dairy and poultry dispute,  it is evident that many factors have made
the dispute a difficult one to resolve.  It is our view that the dispute will not now be resolved
by government  initiatives. 2'  The need to do so will  come from industry and the economic
realities of the marketplace.  This dispute demonstrates  the case of economics  leading the
political  process. 2 2 The  government  still  dominates  but  cannot  stop  the  harmonization
process  that  is  taking  place  in  trade,  inspection,  labelling,  health  claims,  food  safety,
19 Canadian supply management  has its origins  in the  simple policy objective  that
producers  should receive  a fair return for their labour and investments  as announced in a Speech
from the Throne  in  1971.  How this policy was operationalized  and administered has given rise
to the poultry and dairy  disputes, even though for dairy,  at least, U.S. policy objectives were
similar.
20  The use of U.S. trade laws was noted as a concern in the text of the  1989 CUSTA.  The
recent decision  by the U.S. government  to ignore the WTO Panel  examining the Helms-Burton
Law again fuels the perception that the  United States will not abide by international rules if they
hurt.
21 Indeed, Mayer and Josling suggest that the nature of the U.S. political system makes
change  in U.S.  dairy policy difficult to  achieve.  See Agricultural Policy Reform. Politics  and
Process in the EC and USA,  1990.
22 For a discussion on how market forces are reshaping corporate America and how the
policy makers  are failing to keep up, see  Tales of a New America, by Robert B.  Reich,
particularly chapter 20.
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HACCP, technology, products,  and the rationalization  of food manufacturing on a NAFTA
basis.
One way to speed progress is to remove the fear producers have that they will lose
income  or be put out of business.  This goal can be achieved by policy analysts showing
producers that market acceptance of the products they produce is the only way to ensure their
future.  This point was made at last year's dairy session but as the poultry dispute shows, this
means reversing or undoing what has been said many times - not an easy task.  Another
way to speed up the process  is to harmonize Canadian and U.S. trade laws, anti-dumping and
countervail ones  in particular, and agree on safety mechanisms which can be used once a free
trade environment  is achieved.
Uncertainty  and the inability to obtain competitively priced inputs  from the dairy and
poultry sectors are forcing changes on the  supply management commodities  as are changes
in the market place and  in technology.  Change is also being  fuelled by  the debt  loads of
governments.  Corporations do not like uncertainty or risk.  They are  always taking steps to
create a more certain future with reduced risks.  Reduced  costs and increased productivity
are being achieved by rationalization,  adopting new technology,  consolidation,  entering  into
strategic alliances,  benchmarking, and developing  export markets.  In Canada, the pace of
change  is quicker beyond the  farm  gate than  at the  producer  level for both the  dairy and
poultry sectors.  In the United States, changes  at the processing level are also significant. It
is  an  irreversible  process  which  in  part has  been  accelerated  by  the  WTO  agreement,
particularly  for dairy.  The production  sectors will have to join in and there are  signs that
supply management producers are realizing they must do more to ensure their future.  Some
interprovincial production transfers have taken place and some provinces have removed the
maximum size restrictions  for registered  growers.
Several  interesting  ideas  are  being pursued  by  groups  of producers,  taking  them
beyond the farm gate.  These moves have  been made possible in part because after twenty
years of supply management,  producers  and cooperatives  have a stronger capital base than
do the processor and  further processor sectors.  It is not surprising that in the dairy sector,
several  co-ops have recently  made  strategic  moves.  (i.e.,  Agropur  purchasing  Ault milk
business,  1997.)
The NAFTA decision has given many stakeholders  in the poultry and dairy producer
sector the confidence that there remains at least ten years of protection.  As a result,  quota
value  for chicken  in Ontario has increased from $18 a bird to $23  and complacency is again
settling  in.  The pace of change has slowed down and a new battle appears to be developing
over the price of live chicken.  We view this as a temporary  situation as most stakeholders
feel,  including individual producers,  that the current protection will gradually erode.  This
position  is  supported  by  the  realization  that  border protection  is  not  complete  and that
"leakage"  of products  not controlled at the border  is increasing.  The leakage problem  is
greater  for poultry  than  for dairy because  fowl meat  is not  covered  by tariff rate  quotas
(TRQs).  For  example,  of the  $88.5  million  of further  processed  poultry  products  (i.e.,
chicken dinners,  frozen entrees, or fully prepared meals) imported  last year from the  United
States,  70  percent  or $62  million  was  not covered  by  TRQs.  In  1988,  imports  for  this
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category totalled only  $30 million.  Similarly,  Canada has become a major market for U.S.
fowl  meat with imports increasing during  five out of the last six years.
Harmonization  of  the  poultry  and  dairy  sectors  on  a  NAFTA  basis  is  a  real
possibility.  The technology  and  inspection  systems  are  very  similar  already,  while the
regulatory  environment  is  being  harmonized  a  little  bit  at  a  time.  When  the  border
restrictions are removed,  it is our view that, like beef,  Canada, the United States and Mexico
will trade poultry and dairy products on a north/south  basis.  In dairy, the results presented
by  Meilke  et al.  at the  last workshop  was  an  outcome with which  we are  comfortable.23
Often,  U.S.  analysts  have  over-estimated  the  gain  that  can  be  made  from  trade  while
Canadian analysis has underestimated Canada's ability to be competitive with U.S. producers
and processors of dairy and poultry.  The food service distribution sector, which uses at least
40 to 50 percent of the poultry produced in North America, is quickly being reorganized  on
a north/south basis.  The feed grain industry  is similarly reorganizing  on a north/south basis,
particularly now that the Crow Rate has been eliminated.  Since Canada is already shipping
feed grain  into the United  States and  feed  grain makes  up about 60 percent of the  cost of
producing poultry, Canada can be a competitive poultry producer.24
Further evidence that two-way trade will be a reality can be found in dairy and poultry
export and import performance since  1990.  For example,  two-way trade  in dairy products,
despite  border measures,  has increased from US$65  million in 1990 to US$140 million in
1995.  Although the United  States is the net exporter,  Canadian  dairy exports  to the United
States are also increasing.  In  1994, Canadian dairy exports totalled about US$50 million and
in  1996  are expected  to reach  over US$76  million.  Imports of chicken have grown  from
about  51  kilotonnes  in  1990 to over  57 kilotonnes  in  1996.  Chicken exports  have grown
from almost  nothing to  18.5 kilotonnes  in  1996.  Canadian  chicken exports  compete with
U.S. chicken  exports  in offshore  markets but  further processed chicken  products are  also
being marketed in the United States.  A similar pattern can be observed in the trade  flows for
turkey products.
In the dairy sector on both sides of the border,  changes  in policy have been made as
a result of the WTO and budget pressures  in Canada.  Subsidies are being phased out over
a period  of time but we  do  not see this change  bringing  about increased  trade.  It does,
however,  bring the possibility of freer trade a step closer.  Similarly, the shift from producer
financed  subsidies  to  an end-use pricing system  brings the  dairy  sector  closer to market
realities.  This particular  change in Canadian dairy policy is being informally  reviewed by
23  Similar results are forecast  by Langley et al.  in their recent article,  "Dairy Policies are
Limiting U.S.-Canada Trade," published  in the January/February  1997 issue of Agricultural
Outlook, ERS,  USDA.  This is  an excellent,  well-balanced  article and more work of this nature is
needed.
24 A study by De Valk Consulting Inc. comparing  the competitiveness of Canada and U.S.
poultry processors  shows that the difference  in processing  costs has narrowed significantly  since
1991.  The January  1996 issue of Poultry  International  contains broiler meat cost of production
comparisons.  Although  Canada is not included, our information  on Canada suggests that costs
similar to the United States are achievable.
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Australia,  New Zealand  and the United States to determine  if WTO  conformity  has  been
achieved.  If the approach is found wanting, the WTO may yet be the catalyst for some more
fundamental  changes.25 Interprovincial quota transfers (similar to the EC's country transfers)
are becoming a reality and will help rationalize  production on a more effective basis, but this
is something policy analysts recommended be put in place twenty years ago.
The U.S. dairy policy change  to consolidate  the current thirty-two  milk marketing
orders into eleven will expand each region's market and is a necessary  interim step to achieve
harmonization.  Just as in Canada,  any remaining interprovincial  barriers  on dairy products
and milk have to be eliminated.  The  issue of imitation dairy products also has to be dealt
with and Quebec's recent suggestion that all provinces harmonize  by each adopting the same
prohibition on margarine is not a realistic one.  Pressure to eliminate  provincial restrictions
is building.
The NAFTA agreement  has the greatest impact on the Mexican dairy industry  as a
ten-to-fifteen year phase  in period to achieve trade without restrictions is in place.
The likelihood of harmonization  is made  more  compelling when  consideration  is
given  to the  form  of ownership  that  might  evolve  in  the  poultry  and dairy  industries.
Currently, there  are three approaches being used to achieve vertical coordination:  the U.S.
vertical  integration approach where control is achieved through  100 percent ownership and
one-to-one  grower  contracts;  the  European  supply  chain  management  approach  where
vertical coordination is achieved through means other than 100 percent ownership or control,
including "voluntary" cooperation;  and the Canadian  supply management approach  where
vertical cooperation  is attempted under the umbrella of national marketing agencies.  It is our
view  that  the  supply  chain  management  concept  will evolve  as  the preferred  approach
because  it provides the ability to manage food safety issues in a cost effective  manner and
best responds to changing consumer demands.  We see both U.S. vertically  integrated firms
and Canada's supply management system evolving toward the chain management model.  In
Canada,  this will mean that an independent  producer sector coordinated  through producer
agencies can continue to exist while in the United States, the larger vertically integrated firms
will likely spin off units and become more  focused on core business.26
The  common  goal  of ensuring  production  of safe  food  products  will  bring  the
Canadian and U.S. industries closer together.  Sharing the same export markets  and being a
consistent exporter will do likewise.
As these changes take place, governments  will follow and,  from time to time, may be
tempted to stall or reverse the process in response  to demands by special interest  groups.  It
is  during these actions  that analysts  will need to ensure that  policy makers  have  a  good
understanding of  the options and the outcome.  If, as Kempton Matte suggested at last year's
seminar,  the  analysis  available  is  complete  and  includes  the  downstream  and  trade
25 If it is "approved",  it is likely the United  States will adopt a similar approach.
26 Alan Barkema and Mark Drabenstott,  The Many Paths of Vertical Coordination.
Structural  Implications  for the U.S. Food Industry.
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implications,  the policy makers will at least have the economic consequences  of their policy
choices  clearly  set  out.  This was  not the  case when dairy  and poultry policies  were first
developed.
CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are a number of conclusions  we have drawn from the poultry and dairy
disputes.
The use of dispute settlement  mechanisms does not always resolve  the dispute.  It
could, and probably has, made resolution more difficult.  Policy makers should only
use  this mechanism when  the implications  of both  winning and  losing, both  in the
short and long run, are considered.
International  trade rules,  even  in agriculture,  are starting  to have  some impact  on
modifying "political"  rule-making.
The transparency provided  by international trade rules is  superior to  "political" rule-
making and  supply management rule-making.  Transparency  and predictability  are
good  for business because they reduce risk and uncertainty.
Policy analysts and agricultural  economists have a role to play in bringing to bear on
agricultural  and food disputes,  transparent  rule-making.  Their input  can help keep
issues  from  becoming  disputes  and  provide  opportunities  for  harmonization.  A
greater reliance  on international  trade rules also achieves this objective.
Canada's  aggressive  efforts  to  increase  access  and  reduce  barriers  to  trade for  all
agricultural products  while keeping in place trade restrictions  for poultry and  dairy
will be difficult to defend and maintain  both domestically  and internationally.  The
latter  because  doing  so  contradicts  the  spirit  of the  trade  agreements Canada  has
signed,  as shown  by this  dispute.  Inconsistency  in approach,  by  developing  trade
policy  for sectors, leads to disputes.
*  Both  Canada  and the  United  States  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  producing
poultry  and dairy  products  compared  to  other  producers  around the world.  This
common denominator  should provide opportunities  for harmonization and freer trade
so that both countries  can build a strong North American  base from which to export
and also one which will be of benefit to Mexico.
*  The poultry program in Canada, and dairy program in both countries, transfers income
to  producers.  If this factor  is addressed,  a more  harmonized  environment  can  be
achieved more quickly.
Although  it does not appear to be part of most of  the workshop presentations,  we will
take this  opportunity to move beyond  conclusions to recommendations.  In order to defuse
the dairy and poultry dispute, the following suggestions  are put forward:
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1.  The  U.S.  poultry  industry  needs  to  develop  meaningful  and  representative  live
chicken and turkey prices that can be compared to Canadian  live prices by developing
a more transparent pricing arrangement with their contract growers.
2.  In both dairy and poultry,  Blue Ribbon Industry Panels (U.S.  and Canadian) should
be established to make recommendations to both governments on how and when freer
trade can be achieved.
3.  The Canadian  and U.S.  governments  should resume their efforts to develop  a new
regime of trade remedies  and  safeguards,  pushed by  industry  on both sides of the
border.
4.  Harmonization of inspection systems, labelling, product definition and other technical
areas need to be continued and encouraged.
5.  In Canada, interprovincial movement of milk and poultry production quotas should
be facilitated and maximum limits on farm size should be removed.
6.  Interprovincial  trade barriers  in the dairy sector and interprovincial  differences  on
imitation  dairy products  should be eliminated while in the United States, the efforts
to reduce the number of milk marketing orders should continue.
7.  Policy analysts should be studying the implications of removing border controls  on
poultry and dairy products  based on industry  structures and costs which reflect the
outcome of structural adjustments made during a suitable adjustment period.
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